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DATING DANGEROUSLY: RISKS LURKING 
WITHIN MOBILE DATING APPS 
Alyssa Murphy 
Looking for love has never been easy, but in the twenty-first century, it has 
become dangerous.1 Mobile dating applications (“apps”) have taken over the 
way young people meet by connecting strangers, not based on commonalities, 
but rather by their location.2 The dating apps have quickly risen in popularity3 
and frequently result in new relationships,4 but the number of crimes committed 
due to connections made through the apps has increased as well.5 For example, 
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 1 See Vanessa Borge, The Dangers Of Looking For Love Online, CBS MIAMI (June 11, 
2015, 11:01 PM), http://miami.cbslocal.com/2015/06/11/the-dangers-of-looking-for-love-
online/. See also Aaron Smith & Maeve Duggan, Online dating & Relationships, PEW RE-
SEARCH 2 (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/10/21/online-dating-relation-
ships/ (explaining that since 2005, online daters are more likely to meet people they have 
met online for dates). 
 2 Theo Miller, How Tinder Became A Gateway Dating App, FORBES (Aug. 7, 2017, 
1:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/theodorecasey/2017/08/07/how-tinder-became-a-
gateway-dating-app/#6e1b6eb739b5. See generally Privacy Policy, TINDER, 
https://www.gotinder.com/privacy (last visited Dec. 19, 2017) (stating that a user’s geo-
graphic location is collected while the application is running); Privacy Policy, BUMBLE, 
https://bumble.com/en-us/privacy (last visited Dec. 19, 2017) (listing how geolocation is 
used by the application to offer certain features to the users and informing the user that de-
spite disabling location services, Bumble can still determine a user’s city, state, and country 
location). 
 3 See generally Online Dating Statistics, STAT. BRAIN (May 12, 2017), http://www.statistic-
brain.com/online-dating-statistics/ (showing up to date statistics regarding online dating in-
cluding numbers of users and percentage of successful relationships). 
 4 See generally id. 
 5 Crimes Linked to Tinder and Grindr Increase Seven Fold, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 16, 
2016, 12:55 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/16/crimes-linked-to-tinder-and-
grindr-increase-seven-fold/. 
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in 2016, the body of Preston Talley was found in Brooksville, Florida.6 Investi-
gators later learned that one of Talley’s killers, Kayla Morrow, a potential part-
ner he met through a mobile dating app, lured him to a secluded area using sex 
and methamphetamine.7 Three men were awaiting the pair’s arrival and pro-
ceeded to beat Talley to death with a baseball bat.8 Law enforcement officials 
were able to apprehend all four individuals. Each was subsequently charged with 
first-degree murder.9 Unfortunately, this example is the exception, not all perpe-
trators are caught.10 
Globally, and specifically in the United States, millions of people of all ages 
have begun using mobile dating apps.11 For example, Tinder, one of the most 
popular dating apps, hosts over 50 million users worldwide.12 Online dating, and 
more specifically mobile online dating, has increased for all ages over the past 
two years.13 Young millennials favor mobile dating as a predominant form of 
dating because they are more likely to own a Smartphone than other members 
of the population.14 Dating apps have become the normal way to date and to get 
to know each other; it is therefore unsurprising the amount of dating apps avail-
able for download has increased in the past several years as well.15 Some of the 
most commonly used dating apps explored in this Comment include Tinder, 
Bumble, Grindr, and Hinge.16 
One similarity employed by all of these dating apps is the active proximity-
based location system.17 Proximity-based systems continuously broadcast and 
                                                 
 6 Abraham Rinquist, 10 Dating App Murders, LISTVERSE (Nov. 26, 2016), 
http://listverse.com/2016/11/26/10-dating-app-murders/. 
 7 Rinquist, supra note 6. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See generally Erika Borrajo, Manuel Gámez-Guadix & Esther Calvete, Justification 
Beliefs of Violence, Myths about Love and Cyber Dating Abuse, 27 PSICOTHEMA 327, 331 
(2015) (describing the rise of cyber abuse among young individuals). 
 11 Kevin Murnane, Report Shows More People of All Ages Are Dating Online, FORBES 
(Mar. 2, 2016, 6:15 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinmurnane/2016/03/02/pew-re-
port-who-uses-mobile-dating-apps-and-online-dating-sites/#8194fc966e30 (“Online dating 
appears to have increased for almost every age group over the past two years.”). 
 12 Nick Bilton, Tinder Taps an Age-Old Truth, N.Y. TIMES, OCT. 30, 2014, at E1. 
 13 Murnane, supra note 11. 
 14 Id. 
 15 The 8 Best dating Apps for 2017, DIGITAL TRENDS (Aug. 11, 2017, 9:24 AM), 
http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/best-dating-apps/. See also Murnane, supra note 11. 
 16 See generally Nathan McAlone, RANKED: America’s most popular dating apps from 
best to worst, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 11, 2016, 12:22 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-
best-and-worst-dating-apps-in-2016-ranked-by-reviews-2016-2/#no-5-tinder-395100-7 
(ranking dating apps with over 2,000 reviews to determine which were meeting user expec-
tations). 
 17 Jody Farnden, Ben Martini & Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Privacy Risks in Mobile 
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track a user’s location to help facilitate meeting people nearby.18 But the sharing 
and storage of such intimate and private information on the app, whether pur-
posely given by the user or not, raises concerns about the user’s privacy and 
safety.19 Based on this feature, predators lurking in the digital shadows of the 
dating apps can ascertain a user’s address, view their movements throughout the 
day and eventually, virtually stalk a user.20 They can do so by monitoring and 
keeping track of the user’s location when he or she indicates he or she is at home, 
at work, or elsewhere, by noting how many miles away the users are from each 
other at that time.21 The constant tracking allows dangerous users to reconstruct 
daily patterns of their prey.22 As a result, the inherent characteristics of these 
modern apps coax unscrupulous users into exploiting potential lovers.23 Coupled 
with the lack of restrictions on a user’s ability to access personal information, 
this free flow of information opens the door to dangers associated with a lax in 
privacy protections and worse, the dangers associated with acts of violence fa-
cilitated by the app.24 But once an infringement on intimate, personal information 
has occurred, or an act of violence has taken place associated with a mobile da-
ting app, what information can be accessed in order to catch the culprit red-
handed, or in this reality, phone-in-hand? 
This alarming reality raises the issue of what data can actually be accessed in 
the assistance of prosecuting crimes associated with the apps without infringing 
on user’s privacy interests any more than mobile dating apps already do. Recent 
case studies have used forensic techniques on popular proximity-based dating 
apps in order to determine the types of data that can be recovered from user’s 
devices.25 These studies have revealed the types of information available for re-
covery from mobile dating apps: 
[t]hrough network traffic monitoring we were able to collect profile pictures, chat, 
nearby users, user profile and device information. A preview of the last message 
sent or received from each user can be viewed, but not historical messages. The 
users [sic] profile is recoverable, along with a list of users they have declared as a 
                                                 
Dating Apps 1 (2015) Proceedings of the 21st Americas Conference on Information Sys-
tems, Conference in Puerto Rico 13-15, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1505.02906.pdf. 
 18 Id. at 1-2. 
 19 Id. at 2. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 6. 
 22 See generally Doug Gross, How Your Movements Create a GPS Fingerprint, CNN 
(Mar. 26, 2013, 2:39 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/26/tech/mobile/mobile-gps-pri-
vacy-study/index.html (showing how location data can be used to predict the behaviors of 
an individual). 
 23 See generally Farnden, supra note 17, at 2 (describing how data from mobile dating 
apps are being used in not only traditional crimes but also cybercrimes). 
 24 Id. at 2. 
 25 Id. at 5. 
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‘match.’26 
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, courts have de-
termined the government must obtain a warrant, stated with particularized facts 
that are sufficient to indicate the data to be searched from a cell phone.27 This 
data inherently includes information stored on mobile dating apps.28 However, 
obtaining a warrant is not troublesome for law enforcement officers, including 
prosecutors, when there is a showing, supported by probable cause, that data 
stored on mobile dating apps aids in apprehension or conviction of the offender.29 
This Comment will discuss the importance of finding a delicate balance be-
tween privacy interests associated with using modern mobile dating apps and 
the need for user protection from heinous crimes. In prosecuting these crimes, 
users must be willing to relinquish their private information in exchange for jus-
tice. Part I will explain and breakdown the dating apps, including how they work 
and how they are used, in order to give a comprehensive understanding of the 
characteristics that lead to poignant criticism of the apps. Part II will briefly ex-
plore the types of crimes that typically stem from mobile dating apps including 
solicitation, stalking, murder, and human trafficking. Part III will address the 
privacy risks exposed by the apps, specifically focusing on the types of infor-
mation that is retrievable from a mobile dating app. This section will address the 
differences in the data that comprises a location record and data that concerns 
intimate messages and other stored information from the apps. Lastly, Part IV 
will analyze the legal implications specific to a search of data stored in mobile 
dating apps under the Fourth Amendment. Namely, it will address the scope of 
a search warrant granting the search of a cell phone and emphasize the im-
portance of describing with particularity the data to be searched. Part IV will 
argue that obtaining a warrant for intimate information, aside from geolocation 
data, should not be a hurdle for the prosecution. Achieving justice for victims of 
crimes associated with mobile dating apps substantially outweighs the potential 
infringement on the user’s privacy with a limited scope. 
BREAKDOWN OF THE APPS 
                                                 
 26 Id. 
 27 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306-07 n.11 (1967) (“Government may demon-
strate probable cause and lawfully search for stolen property even though the true owner is 
unknown or unavailable to request and authorize the Government to assert his interest. As to 
instrumentalities, the Court in Gouled allowed their seizure, not because the Government 
had some property interest in them (under the ancient, fictitious forfeiture theory), but be-
cause they could be used to perpetrate further crime.”). 
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A. The Logistics: How to Use Modern Mobile Dating Apps 
Tinder has over 50 million members with about 10 million members who are 
active every day.30 Tinder is one of the biggest and most widely used dating apps 
of the twenty-first century.31 Tinder and other similar dating apps use Facebook 
users’ accounts in order to set up basic elements of the dating profile.32 Once 
logged in and linked through Facebook, Tinder users answer several questions 
specific to intimate preferences such as sexual orientation, age demographics, 
and the distance the user is willing to travel to meet up with his or her partner.33 
In setting up the basic profile, users can add and rearrange photos already linked 
to the Tinder account through the user’s Facebook profile.34 
The user has several positive benefits by linking a user’s Facebook profile to 
his or her Tinder account. Overall, Facebook, as a single entity is considered 
safe.35 Facebook ensures that profiles viewed on Tinder are real by removing 
fake profiles from the site.36 Since Facebook and Tinder associate and share the 
user’s photos, users can save time editing or updating his or her dating app by 
allowing the app to pull the user’s latest photos he or she has added to Face-
book.37 The most favorable aspect of the link between Tinder and Facebook is 
that a user can see what friends they have in common with a potential match on 
the dating app.38 This crucial detail allows users to feel like they can authenticate 
the potential lover before meeting in real life to provide assurance that a user is 
not falling prey to a trap like Preston Talley.39 
Besides being able to link a user’s account to his or her Facebook profile, 
another reason Tinder’s popularity is burgeoning is the “swipe” feature.40 The 
act of swiping, or moving a finger from one side of the phone screen to the other, 
on someone’s profile indicates whether someone is interested in the person.41 
The app presents users with a snapshot of potential “matches” based on photos 
and other information in a person’s profile.42 If the user is uninterested, he or she 
can swipe left.43 Conversely, if the user is interested in starting a conversation 
                                                 
 30 Christen Costa, How Does Tinder Work? What Is Tinder?, GADGET REV. (Dec. 30, 
2016), http://www.gadgetreview.com/how-does-tinder-work-what-is-tinder. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Rinquist, supra note 6. 
 40 Costa, supra note 30. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See id. 
 43 Id. 
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with that person, he or she can swipe right.44 The “match” terminology stems 
from the users both swiping right on each other’s profiles.45 Users are limited in 
their number of swipes per day, regardless of which direction.46 However, pre-
mium versions of these apps, specifically Tinder, allow the user to make more 
swipes per day.47 Once matched, users can enter into a screen resembling a chat 
room or text message configuration in which either partner can initiate a conver-
sation.48 However, the more information users are willing to share on his or her 
Tinder profile, the higher the risks are for privacy infringements and suscepti-
bilities to crimes like stalking.49 For example, with permission, users can link 
their Instagram accounts to their Tinder profiles so other users have greater ac-
cess to photos and private information.50 Another form of information that can 
be shared by the user’s account, so long as their phone is powered on, is a steady 
stream and record of the user’s geolocation.51 
B. Geolocation: The Crux of Mobile Dating Apps 
The ubiquitous use of geolocation tracking on Tinder and similar mobile da-
ting apps allows users to always know who is nearby and available to meet with-
out traveling far from the user’s position.52 Geolocation technology refers to the 
process of determining the position of a user’s mobile device; the position itself 
is called the geolocation and modern mobile dating apps could not function with-
out it.53 Geolocation information increases the functionality of the app and is 
convenient for users searching for a partner from the comfort of their homes – 
an attractive component of all mobile dating apps.54 The position is determined 
by the user’s latitude and longitude on a traditional map and that information is 
frequently related to original Global Positioning System (“GPS”) information 
and technology.55 Such services are today called Location Based Services and 
                                                 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Always Be Oriented with the Integration of Geolocation into Your App, CLEVEROAD 
(Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.cleveroad.com/blog/always-be-orientated-with-the-integration-
of-geolocation-into-your-app. 
 52 Costa, supra note 30. 
 53 Always Be Oriented with the Integration of Geolocation into Your App, supra note 51. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Daniel Ionescu, Geolocation 101: How It Works, the Apps, and Your Privacy, 
PCWORLD (Mar. 29, 2010, 7:45 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/192803/geolo.html. 
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are accessible on all mobile devices with GPS tools.56 Since the app keeps up-
dating and continually tracks the user’s geolocation, it is feasible and preferred 
that the pool of potential matches changes as the user’s location changes.57 
Although all mobile dating apps use various Location Based Services, they 
are not all “created equal.”58 Some geolocation technologies are slower than oth-
ers and therefore do not provide the best routes for modern mobile daters.59 Most 
Smartphones employ a Wi-Fi network proximity system to coordinate user’s ge-
olocation, even while indoors.60 This technology analyzes the names and ad-
dresses of Wi-Fi networks nearby, allowing the app to ascertain exactly where 
the user is located by pinpointing Wi-Fi networks to which the phone is close 
enough to connect.61 A hybrid system such as this, which combines Wi-Fi prox-
imity with GPS coordinates, is the best and most reliable indicator of a user’s 
location at any given time.62 Without this accuracy, users would experience 
greater hurdles finding companionship on mobile dating apps.63 
C. An Explosion of Mobile Dating Apps 
Other mobile dating apps follow Tinder’s example by successfully harnessing 
users’ geolocation and Facebook profiles as a basis for matches.64 Bumble, a 
close competitor of Tinder, operates in logistically the same way as its larger 
                                                 
 56 Id. 
 57 Costa, supra note 30. 
 58 McAlone, supra note 16. 
 59 See Jack Cox, Using Geolocation Technology to Improve Customer Experience – An-
other Lesson from the Mobile World of Pokémon Go, CAPTECH (Sept. 26, 2016), 
https://www.captechconsulting.com/blogs/geolocation-technology-improve-customer-expe-
rience-lesson-mobile-world-pokemon-go (discussing other location technologies that other 
popular apps use). 
 60 Larry Greenemeier, A Positioning System that Goes Where GPS Can’t, SCI. AM. (Jan. 
23, 2008), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/indoor-positioning-system/. 
 61 See Marie Black, What Is Bumble? Bumble Dating App FAQ, TECHADVISOR (Dec. 
12, 2014), http://www.techadvisor.co.uk/feature/software/what-is-bumble-bumble-dating-
app-faq-3590386/ (showing how distance can affect matches on Bumble). 
 62 Fred Zahradnik, An Explanation of Wi-Fi Triangulation, LIFEWIRE (June 12, 2017), 
https://www.lifewire.com/wifi-positioning-system-1683343 (“Wi-Fi GPS . . . is particularly 
useful in urban areas where there are Wi-Fi networks broadcasting all over the place. How-
ever, the benefits are even greater when you consider that there are some circumstances 
where it’s simply too difficult for GPS to work, like underground, in buildings or malls 
where GPS is too weak or intermittent.”). 
 63 Id. 
 64 What Is Bumble Dating App and How Does It Work?, MY DATING HACKS, http://my-
datinghacks.com/what-is-bumble-dating-app-and-how-does-it-work/ (last visited Dec. 19, 
2017). 
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counterpart—by linking dating profiles with social media accounts like Face-
book.65 However, in this app the woman must be the first to message her match.66 
With this feature, Bumble hoped to reduce the number of inappropriate messages 
initiated by men, therefore granting women a little more protection from un-
wanted communications.67 
Still, Bumble, like Tinder, borrows users’ profile pictures from Facebook and 
users’ “age, location, job title, and educational background.”68 Users of Bumble, 
like users of other dating apps, are cognizant that private information like this 
will be visible to all users of the app when they sign up.69 Nevertheless, they bear 
the risk of other users taking advantage of this free-flow of information.70 Unique 
to Bumble, matches formed as a result of mutual “right-swipes” expire after 
twenty-four hours of the match.71 A failure on behalf of the woman to initiate 
conversation gives the man an option to extend the window of initiation another 
twenty-four hours.72 If the woman still does not message the man (or woman in 
the case of same-sex partnerships), then the match will permanently expire.73 In 
a sense, this ensures that current matches are always up-to-date and gives the 
woman more control of whom she wishes to let into her virtual, and real life.74 
Another mobile dating app closely modeled after Tinder is Grindr.75 Grindr is 
the largest social networking app exclusively targeted toward gay and bisexual 
men.76 The app has over two million daily users in over one hundred and ninety-
two countries.77  Setting up a Grindr profile is slightly more in-depth than Tinder 
or Bumble. Grindr does not gather information from the user’s Facebook profile 
unless the user gives the app permission to link the profiles later on in the setup 
process.78 Instead, the user fills in personal information like a display name, 
headline, age (users must be over the age of eighteen), and a biography compris-
ing of a brief description of interests, hobbies, intentions, and the like.79 Grindr 
caters to the gay community by allowing users to identify themselves through 
                                                 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Black, supra note 61. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 What Is Bumble Dating App and How Does It Work?, supra note 64. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 About, GRINDR, https://www.grindr.com/about/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2017). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 How to Use Grindr, WIKIHOW, http://www.wikihow.com/Use-Grindr (last visited 
Dec. 19, 2017). 
 79 Id. 
2018] Dating Dangerously 9 
“Grindr Tribes.”80 The gay community uses “tribes” to indicate body type and 
other physical qualities to guarantee a more realistic match while using the app.81 
For example, the tribe term “Twink” is often used to describe a young college 
student who is thin in stature.82 Yet, the tribe term “Bear” refers to someone who 
is heavier and often has more body hair.83 By using accepted terminology in the 
gay community, Grindr allows users to advertise their outward appearance to 
potential partners.84 
Unlike Tinder or Bumble, Grindr did not adopt the “swipe” feature as a way 
to match users with other users.85 Instead, other users nearby appear on a single 
screen.86 From there, users can select other user’s accounts by tapping on the 
image to enlarge the profile picture and to read more biographical information 
shared by that user.87 If the user is not impressed by any options provided on the 
first screen, the user can scroll down to load more men nearby or to filter the 
presented men based on individualized preferences such as eyebrow color, arm 
hair density, and muscle tone.88 This real-time snapshot into the men located near 
the user, similar to geolocational snapshots in other apps like Tinder and Bum-
ble, allow the user to be more selective in his communications because there are 
always new people moving into the same area as the user.89 The Grindr user, if 
intrigued, can save potential interests to his “favorites” folder by selecting the 
star feature. If he chooses, he can start a conversation.90 
The final mobile dating app this Comment explores is Hinge.91 Hinge creators 
wanted to excel and stand out in a world of dating that has been commonly re-
ferred to as an “apocalypse.”92 Mobile dating has adopted this negative stigma 
because of the abundance of reported unsuccessful relationships attributable to 
the use of dating apps.93 As a result, Hinge decided to re-vamp their app with 
                                                 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. (stating that users on Grindr tap on pictures of other users to add potential dates to 
their favorites). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id.; Kris Seto, 18 Ground Rules for Grindr, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 7, 2011, 11:13 
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kris-seto/grindr-rules_b_977982.html. 
 89 Seto, supra note 88. 
 90 How to Use Grindr, supra note 78. 
 91 Kristin Tice Studeman, Hinge, a Dating App, Introduces Friends of Friends, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 28, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/30/fashion/hinge-a-dating-app-
introduces-friends-of-friends.html?_r=0. 
 92 Margaret Abrams, Can the New Version of Hinge Actually Change How We Use Da-
ting Apps?, OBSERVER (Oct. 14, 2016, 11:08 AM), http://observer.com/2016/10/can-the-
new-version-of-hinge-actually-change-how-we-use-dating-apps/. 
 93 Id. 
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hopes of helping users actually meet and find a viable relationship.94 The app 
employs tactics similar to Tinder and Bumble in that syncing profiles with the 
user’s Facebook account, mutual friends, and geolocation.95 However, Hinge 
takes profiles to the next level by encouraging users to share personal anecdotes 
and activities ranging from shows the user is watching on Netflix to a go-to list 
of karaoke songs favored by the user.96 Instead of swiping, Hinge and Grindr are 
similar in that nearby choices emerge from a singular screen; it is up to the user 
to “heart” or “favorite” specific activities the other person enjoys as a means to 
start a conversation with more substance than merely saying “hey.”97 Hinge also 
offers a “deal-breaker” feature, which allows users to ignore other users based 
on certain undesirable characteristics like age or even location if the user is far-
ther than one is willing to travel.98 Although the intentions of providing more 
substantive and personal information on the app is arguably good, it raises addi-
tional concerns of the user’s privacy and threats of exploitation of shared infor-
mation, for example, if one were to gain access to the information unlawfully.99 
CRIMES ASSOCIATED WITH MOBILE DATING APPS 
A. The Environment Created by Mobile Dating Apps Invites Danger 
Unfortunately for users trying to find love in the digital age, crimes, including 
rape, attempted murder, child sex grooming, and various cybercrimes are linked 
to dating apps like Tinder and Grindr.100 These dating app crimes have increased 
seven fold in just two years.101 The crime rates have become staggeringly high in 
recent years due to the perpetually growing number of users the apps attract and 
the geolocation service provided while using the apps.102  Specifically, the geo-
location technology lets the potential assailant know how close he or she is to 
                                                 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 See generally Grooming Dynamic, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, https://victim-
sofcrime.org/media/reporting-on-child-sexual-abuse/grooming-dynamic-of-csa (last visited 
Dec. 19, 2017) (describing the methods child predators use on the Internet to establish a 
trusting relationship that is then used against the victim to break down their defenses and ex-
ploit them). 
 101 Crimes Linked to Tinder and Grindr Increase Seven Fold, supra note 5. 
 102 Id. See also Wendy Saltzman, Warning About Dating Apps After Recent Violent 
Crimes, ABC6 (Apr. 25, 2014, 12:29 AM), http://6abc.com/archive/9515810/. 
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his or her potential victim.103 Thus, the geolocation feature provides users with 
an unprecedented ability to find love nearby without leaving the couch, but also 
exposes the user to unexpected dangers.104 
Figures and statistics describing the crime rates attributable to connections on 
mobile dating apps come from police reports that mention dating apps like Tin-
der or Grindr in the description of the allegation.105 Any mention of any of these 
apps does not necessarily mean the apps were used in commission of the crime.106 
However, indirect mentioning of the apps could mean the victim and suspect 
met on the app or the app was in use at the time of the crime, but the app was 
not directly related to the crime itself.107 For example, the United Kingdom re-
ported that offenders committed more than four hundred offenses in connection 
with dating apps.108 However, law enforcement fears the intimate nature of the 
apps lends itself to more crimes going unreported.109 For instance, closeted as 
well as openly gay men enjoy the use of Grindr.110 This knowledge allows per-
petrators to target closeted gay or bisexual men because they are less likely to 
file reports with the police as a means to protect anonymity.111 An unwillingness 
to report crimes of this nature out of fear of being recognized as homosexual 
leaves users in the dark about all of the serious dangers hidden behind the screens 
of dating apps. 
Although the apps do not intend for circumstances of violence to arise, the 
apps are not equipped to judge whether someone with whom the user is com-
municating is potentially dangerous.112 The ease and free-flow of information on 
the apps make users more open to criminal activity, which in reality, should be 
horrifying for the user, but the number of daily users across the mobile dating 
app sphere continues to sky-rocket every day.113 The recent surge in online and 
mobile dating has “given rise to a ‘new kind of sexual offender,’” one unique to 
the digital age.114 The convenient practice of dating through one’s cell phone has 
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fostered an online environment permeated with risks of meeting the wrong per-
son, at the wrong time, in the wrong place.115 Digital age offenders exploit the 
“arm-chair approach” to dating which encourages users to feel more comfortable 
talking to strangers online, without leaving home.116 When users become com-
fortable, they assume that they are free to propel the relationship forward by 
being open and emotionally honest with a stranger, perhaps by sending flirty or 
sexually explicit messages, and inviting the stranger to the user’s home.117 As a 
result, users of mobile dating apps have increased expectations of sexual activity 
upon the first fact-to-face meeting because they have already established a rap-
port with the other user, frequently based on openness to and a promise of sex.118 
The excitement of sex and love fuels this perilous environment and leaves users 
vulnerable to being victimized by unscrupulous users waiting for his or her 
chance to pounce.119 
B. Crimes of Sexual Violence and Assault 
The most frequently reported crimes associated with dating apps are rape, 
stalking, and the grooming and sexual exploitation of children.120 Sadly, reports 
of rape attributed to the use of mobile dating apps have increased 450% in just 
five years.121 Offenders persuade and coerce their victims into agreeing to meet 
early on in the relationship, and are persistent if initially they do not succeed at 
obtaining sex.122 The anonymity of the apps makes it easier for offenders to be-
come serial rapists at the tap of a button.123 This ease is aided by potential victims 
not thinking of the offender as a stranger, but rather someone he or she has gotten 
to know.124 
For example, police in Fremont, California arrested a twenty-year old student 
who used Tinder to lure at least four unsuspecting victims into meeting him be-
fore he sedated and sexually assaulted them.125 Authorities refer to this assailant 
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and others as “serial social media rapists.”126 Users of this kind hide behind their 
digital profiles and develop trust with their victims before becoming dangerous 
in the real world.127 Two other international examples are even more troubling. 
In New Zealand, a male perpetrator drugged and raped a twenty-eight year old 
woman with whom he had been communicating on Tinder.128 Separately in New 
Zealand, a twenty-six year old woman’s fears of a man’s sexual advances man-
ifested when she jumped off the balcony of a fourteenth-floor apartment – feel-
ing like she had no other option but to engage in sexual intercourse.129 These 
examples merely highlight a few of the millions of heinous, sexual assaults that 
evolve from the use of mobile dating apps every day.130 
C. Stalking and Harassment 
Although not inherently sexual in nature, stalking131 is another activity that 
deceptive users typically exploit through their mobile dating app use.132 The sim-
ple process of sharing the user’s location is commonplace on dating apps, but 
begs the question whether it should be.133 Tales of unsuspecting women sharing 
their locations on dating apps simply to see who else is nearby have culminated 
in tragedy.134 Victims of stalking on dating apps have sensed they may be sharing 
too much personal information on the apps.135 When confronted with this unset-
tling feeling, users have the option to block threatening users of the app, but 
frequently, if this option is pursued, the user may become instigated – forcing 
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2017). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
14 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 26.1 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
the offender to find alternative avenues of contacting the victim.136 
For instance, once the victim blocks the offender on Tinder, stalkers often 
find the victim on Facebook and initiate a renewed attempt to communicate with 
him or her through Facebook Messenger.137 Even if the victim does not respond 
to messages, Facebook creates unfettered access to the user’s life through tagged 
photos or posts from users outside the victim-assailant relationship such as mu-
tual friends or friends of only one of the parties.138 Such posts exhibit geolocation 
data and allow the assailant to gain information about places the victim fre-
quents.139 Mobile dating apps have also been known to share the geolocation of 
its users for up to one hundred and sixty-five days after the initial location share, 
even if the user has not been using the app, helping facilitate stalking behavior.140 
Based on this information, perpetrators often follow their victims into night-
clubs, or other social meeting places, and then home.141 Access to a plethora of 
information renders it unsurprising that non-physical crimes, for example the 
ones perpetrated in cyberspace, are equally as likely to occur through use of 
mobile dating apps.142 
D. Cyber Crimes 
Crimes resembling identity theft and the number of users of mobile dating 
apps have increased correlatively.143 Similarly to how perpetrators of violent 
crimes take advantage of the anonymous yet interpersonal characteristics of the 
app, perpetrators of non-violent cybercrimes thrive on the victim’s desire and 
willingness for a relationship.144 They use this vulnerability to coax victims into 
a relationship of trust before cheating people of their hard earned money.145 One 
way users do so is by creating fake profiles within Tinder that are capable of 
sending messages to various users, tempting them to download mobile games 
with alluring names, like, “Castle Clash,” but for a price.146 Users then download 
                                                 
 136 Id. 
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 145 See id. (detailing how two Colorado residents were arrested for allegedly being re-
sponsible for depriving almost 400 people out of $1 million and explaining that their co-
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these games and effectively enable hackers to access that user’s private and per-
sonal information.147 Mal-intentioned users can then create fake profiles by com-
piling photos and publicly available information posted on any individual’s Fa-
cebook account and then arranging it to match a believable Tinder profile.148 This 
method uses technology built into the app, and users, ensnared by the appeal-
ingly authentic profiles, jeopardize the security of their bank accounts with a 
mere swipe to the right.149 
Additionally, apps frequently launch automated “scripts”150 that are systems 
used to automate responses seemingly from a real person into messages between 
human users and fake accounts called “bots.”151 Bots are programmed to ask and 
answer questions with pre-generated and synthetic responses, simulating con-
versations with real people.152 Frequently, bots adopt the persona of a soldier in 
the military stationed overseas who needs money to fly home so the two can 
meet in person.153 The sensitive and heroic appeal of this ploy can be emotionally 
and financially devastating.154 Once dangerous users obtain private information 
like email addresses, pictures, and other information over the app, the infor-
mation is at risk of being hacked by mal-intentioned users.155  Innocent users are 
urged to be aware of the financial vulnerabilities as well as the physical pitfalls 
one might encounter using mobile dating apps.156 It is crucial for a user to be 
aware of the types of information that can be retrieved from the mobile dating 
app if and when the user indeed stumbles into danger from using one of these 
apps. 
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INFORMATION STORED AND RETRIEVABLE FROM MOBILE DATING 
APPS 
A. Geolocation Data 
As highlighted above, mobile dating apps would cease to exist if it were not 
for geolocation or Location Based Services.157 Geolocation records tend to show 
users’ exact location by using latitude and longitude coordinates.158 It is alarming 
to note that basically all of these statistics are compiled and stored on the app 
itself. For example, Grindr users’ locations are sent from personal cellphones to 
the app server.159 From there, country and city data, determined by latitude and 
longitude coordinates, is recorded and stored within the server.160 Moreover, the 
Grindr app stores timeframes of all of the user’s activity. For example, the app 
stores timeframes when messages are sent and received, as well as where the 
user is located at the time of sending and receiving those messages.161 Tinder 
shares similar timeframes based on where the user is located when he or she 
opens the app using latitude and longitude coordinates.162 Taken together, these 
components “can be used to track users that stay connected to the same net-
work.”163 As a result, geolocation records of a specific user could be used to 
recreate the timeline associated with the perpetration of a crime.164 By permitting 
officers to inspect the phone of an alleged assailant, officers are able to obtain a 
more complete representation of not only the timeline of the crime, but also to 
take a look into the comprehensive nature of the relationship between the victim 
and the perpetrator in the moments leading up to the commission of the crime.165 
B. Private Information 
Unfortunately, most users are unaware of all the personal information they 
offer to the public through their mobile dating apps.166 Recent studies have ana-
lyzed the data that is recoverable from mobile dating apps, including Tinder and 
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Grindr, once the mobile phone is in the hands of law enforcement, or worse, a 
criminal.167 A breakdown of the technological makeup of the apps themselves, 
including the study of functional command paths,168 is used in deciphering what 
information is stored within the app.169 Aside from revealing email addresses, 
pictures, and private text and chat messages, if desired, officials or hackers can 
access images of all nearby dating app user accounts with which a specific user 
recently has interacted.170 If he or she is using Tinder, accessible data can include 
“matches” with innocent users, as well as the dates the “matches” occurred.171 
Analyzing “matches” allows an interested party to establish the connection be-
tween user accounts.172 Law enforcement can use this association as a starting 
point for investigations of crimes related to mobile dating app use.173 Once 
“matches” are known, message tables174 housed within the app reveal messages 
sent and received by the user with timestamps, for each.175 Grindr stores the same 
types of information as well as account information for other profiles linked to 
the user’s account like Instagram, Twitter, or Facebook.176 The feasibility of ex-
tracting private information paired with geolocation data from mobile dating 
apps creates the possibility of reconstructing crimes to prosecute perpetrators of 
offenses.177 
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF ACCESSING INFORMATION STORED ON 
THE APPS 
There is a vast difference between privacy risks associated with obtaining ge-
olocation data from an app on a cellphone and private information such as mes-
sages, stored within a cellphone.178 Cellphones and apps are “constantly gener-
ating and sending a wealth of information to cell service providers who, in turn, 
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store [the] information.” This information, including personal information and 
geolocation data stored within mobile dating apps, is retrievable from the 
phone.179 The pervasiveness of cellphones in today’s society presents new con-
cerns for courts forced to decide whether the Fourth Amendment protections 
should apply to all or some of the various types of data stored in cellphones.180 
As a result, the scope of the Fourth Amendment and geolocation data is distin-
guishable from the private information stored on a cellphone and individual 
apps.181 The purview of the Fourth Amendment must be analyzed and applied to 
private information separately from geolocation data gathered from mobile da-
ting apps.182 The privacy risks attributable to either type of data directly limits 
the items that can lawfully be searched under the Fourth Amendment with either 
a warrant or a subpoena.183 The text of the Fourth Amendment guarantees: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.184 
Thus, the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States articulated that the government 
conducts a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it violates 
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in property worthy of a “sub-
jective expectation of privacy . . . that society is prepared to recognize [that ex-
pectation of privacy] as ‘reasonable.’”185 Therefore, the Fourth Amendment’s 
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powers ought to protect an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy of 
technological progressions outside the purview of the Framer’s intentions.186 Alt-
hough it is a basic principle of the Fourth Amendment that searches and seizures 
of anything in general without a warrant are “presumptively unreasonable,” or 
unfounded in the law, there are a few exceptions, and geolocation data attainable 
from cellphones and apps is one of those exceptions.187 
A. Obtaining Geolocation Data 
Cell phone users, more specifically mobile dating app hopefuls, have a lower 
expectation of privacy in their geolocation data in comparison to other intimate 
information stored within their phones.188 Apps that rely on geolocation technol-
ogy, like mobile dating apps prompt the user for permission to access his or her 
location; even if the user denies access once, the request for permission will re-
appear upon reopening the app or upon turning on the phone.189 By granting the 
dating app permission, users are essentially re-acknowledging their acceptance 
to the Terms and Conditions of that app to which they agreed when they signed 
up.190 This standard agreement typically includes provisions expressing the no-
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tion that information such as geolocation may be stored within the app and pro-
vided or disclosed, if required to do so by law.191 However, to avoid the contin-
uous transcription of geolocation data, users of Smartphones and apps are also 
inherently aware of the readily accessible fact that turning off one’s phone, or 
turning off geolocation services on an individual app, ceases those communica-
tions between the phone and third parties, including service providers.192 Yet, by 
keeping the phone powered on and by accessing mobile dating apps, users are 
aware of the dangers and thus assume the risk that the information will continu-
ously be recorded and possibly sent to third parties.193 
Not only are users cognizant this information is stored by the provider and 
therefore can be handed over to others, they expressly agree to these terms 
through the provider’s standard Terms and Conditions.194 A central element in 
determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
certain data is the effort made to keep the subject information private.195 Thus, 
by willingly and actively transmitting this information to others, users’ expecta-
tion of privacy in their geolocation data is unreasonable.196 Therefore, the Fourth 
Amendment does not extend to the geolocation data on cellphones and mobile 
dating apps, and retrieving this information would not be a search afforded con-
stitutional protections.197 Obtaining geolocation data from a third-party service 
provider or directly from the apps should merely require a subpoena instead of 
a warrant because it does not rise to the level of a search under the parameters 
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of Katz or of the Fourth Amendment.198 
Subpoenas vs. Warrants 
All three branches of the U.S. government possess what has colloquially been 
called the “subpoena power.”199 The power to issue subpoenas refers to “the au-
thority to command persons to appear and testify or to produce documents or 
things.”200 A subpoena launches an adversary process during which the person 
served with the subpoena can challenge its demand in court before complying 
with the order.201 Despite the option to challenge, this strong federal power has 
thrust itself into the government’s responsibilities of investigation and inquisi-
tion.202 The government can open investigations through issuing a subpoena 
merely “on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants 
assurance that it [was] not.”203 This ability is because of the adversary process 
inherent in a subpoena, requiring the production of documents or other things, 
but only after the judicial process is fully afforded to the subject.204 This lower 
threshold of certainty, compared to probable cause specific to issuance of a war-
rant, is a result of the less-invasive nature of the types of information retrievable 
through a subpoena.205 
As a result, a person served with a subpoena is entitled to the Fourth Amend-
ment’s protection against unreasonableness, but in a different way than a war-
rant.206 For example, the Fourth Amendment protects people against “unreason-
able searches and seizures” by imposing a stringent probable cause requirement 
on the warrant due to the potential immediacy and intrusiveness of the search or 
seizure to be conducted.207 A warrant’s “reasonableness” under the Fourth 
Amendment hinges on whether or not the search or seizure itself would be rea-
sonable under the circumstances.208 On the other hand, the “reasonableness” of 
a subpoena is determined by whether the act directed by the subpoena, e.g. the 
production of documents, is reasonable in light of all of the circumstances.209 A 
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person in receipt of a subpoena can choose to comply with its terms or face con-
tempt charges; while a person’s property that is the subject of a warrant has no 
choice but to be searched or seized.210 As such, the Fourth Amendment imposes 
the higher standard of probable cause only to warrants because of the intrusive 
nature of the conduct inherent in carrying out a search or seizure warrant, con-
tradictory to the say of the individual.211 A probable cause standard for warrants 
is necessary to protect against the risk of invading an individual’s privacy in 
personal property to which he or she has demonstrated a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.212 
A subpoena should not be issued unless there is a showing that the information 
from the geolocation record of the user’s phone will help apprehend or convict 
a suspect to a crime related to mobile dating apps.213 In In re Smartphone Geo-
location Data Application, the Court in this instance found geolocation records 
helped apprehend or convict the suspect because undercover officers had been 
able to contact the suspect on that specific phone two times over the past several 
days.214 Additionally, the Court held that for the future, one can obtain geoloca-
tion data, with only a subpoena, based on a showing of how it would help appre-
hend or convict a suspect.215 The Court’s reasoning was based on the fact that 
the subpoena would only reveal a record of the user’s location and nothing fur-
ther.216 Since the user’s location is freely offered to third parties the relatively 
low expectation of privacy in this information necessitates only a court-ordered 
subpoena instead of a warrant.217 
In the specific instance of In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 
the government had sufficient cause to seek not only prospective geolocation 
data for the defendant’s cellphone for the past 30 days, but it also granted an 
order directing the third-party cellphone carrier, to “initiate a signal to determine 
the location of the subject telephone…unobtrusively,” to apprehend the defend-
ant at his location.218 Since the individual had no legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in the location of his cellphone, the government’s actions were valid.219 If 
the defendant wished not to be located by his cell phone, he should have powered 
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it off.220 
If law enforcement were to conduct similar practices on the cellphones of 
suspected perpetrators of crimes on mobile dating apps, they would be able to 
swiftly apprehend offenders.221 Prosecutors can access geolocation of both vic-
tims and defendants to match timelines, identify shared locations between the 
victim and the suspect, and identify the assailant with specific, articulable facts, 
to show that the records are relevant to the criminal investigation.222 Fortunately 
for the prosecution, the legal threshold for issuing a subpoena is low in compar-
ison to that for a warrant.223 The information contained within geolocation rec-
ords can aid in the prosecution of suspects involved with crimes on mobile da-
ting apps and can be attained easily.224 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
Although the Fourth Amendment does not extend to geolocation data, this 
information is nevertheless somewhat protected under the law.225 The disclosure 
of geolocation data through a subpoena is governed under the procedures estab-
lished in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”).226 The relevant 
part of the ECPA provides as follows: 
A governmental entity may require a provider of electronic communication service 
or remote computing device to disclose a record or other information pertaining to 
a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of commu-
nications) only when the government entity 
(A) Obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure…; [or] 
(B) Obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section.227 
Under subsection (B), the government, with a lesser threshold than probable 
cause, must present “specific and articulable facts showing there are reasonable 
grounds to believe the contents of . . . records of other information sought are 
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relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”228 Although the ECPA appears to 
say that the government can only obtain geolocation data through a search war-
rant or court order, under § 2703(d), Congress purposefully excluded “any com-
munication from a tracking device” in its definition of “electronic communica-
tion.”229 In the ECPA, “mobile tracking device” is defined as “an electronic or 
mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or 
object.”230 Courts have been reluctant to construe “tracking device” to mean a 
cellphone.231 For instance, the court in In re Smartphone Geolocation Data pro-
vided that something as simple as a bicyclist leaving tire tracks in a muddy path 
would constitute an “electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking 
of the movement of a person or object” under the ECPA.232 
The ECPA is aimed at devices designed solely to track someone or something, 
such as GPS, as opposed to cellphones, which incidental to their imagined pur-
pose, can be tracked.233 Therefore, rendering a cellphone subject to this definition 
is inconsistent with the statute because they were not designed for the purpose 
of tracking.234  The government may viably seek a court order or a subpoena for 
geolocation data under § 2703(d), if supported by “specific and articulable facts” 
that the records are material to a criminal investigation.235 However, such a com-
paratively low threshold for the issuance of a court order or subpoena to obtain 
geolocation records differs significantly compared to the probable cause re-
quired to search private information within mobile dating apps such as messages 
and contacts.236 
B. Obtaining Private Information 
The scope of the Fourth Amendment, although failing to reach geolocation 
data, pierces the private information stored within cellphones and mobile dating 
apps.237 Users have a heightened expectation of privacy in the content of the in-
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formation stored on his or her cellphone in comparison to geolocation data emit-
ted from the cellphone.238 Therefore, if the collection of this private information 
were to be searched, it would be awarded the protections of a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.239 To obtain information stored within a standard 
Smartphone, the government or operating law enforcement capacity must there-
fore obtain a search warrant under the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
before searching the phone for private information known to be stored within 
various apps.240 If the warrant is not stated with enough particularity, courts have 
been known to reject applications for search warrants, even if supported by prob-
able cause that the information to be searched will aid in an apprehension or 
conviction.241 
The Particularity Requirement of a Warrant 
Applying Fourth Amendment constitutional protections in the modern digital 
age has proved difficult.242 Enhanced technology now allows an individual to 
carry personal information, including potential love interests, around in the palm 
of his or her hand. However, fingertip accessibility does not render such personal 
information any less worthy of the protections guaranteed under the Constitu-
tion.243 This raises an interesting concern of what exactly can be searched within 
a cellphone’s wealth of information. Therefore, the particularity requirement ne-
cessitated by the Fourth Amendment plays an increasingly important role in to-
day’s society.244 
In issuing a search warrant for private information stored within a mobile da-
ting app, the court must balance the interests of an individual’s right to privacy 
and the government’s ability to prosecute suspects of crimes on mobile dating 
apps efficiently and effectively.245 One way of ensuring that this balance is main-
tained is by requiring that warrants contain precise and particular limits on the 
scope of the proposed search.246 Since cellphones and Smartphones have evolved 
to hold vast amounts of “the privacies of life” including sensitive information 
akin to cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, libraries, diaries, and maps, 
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the boundaries described within the application for a search warrant must con-
tain clear parameters of the exact app or function of the phone that is to be 
searched.247 
The only feasible way to describe “the place to be searched” within a 
Smartphone or app, is to specify how to search each app, as opposed to simply 
permitting their search generally.248 For example, applications for search war-
rants pertaining to mobile dating apps should contain a search protocol explain-
ing how the search will separate what the search is permitted to explore from 
what is not.249 The government or law enforcement entity must be as detailed as 
possible, while using intricate, technical formulations, explaining how to gain 
access to the types of information stored within the app via commands and que-
ries.250 This attention to detail illustrates how the government can make focused 
efforts to limit itself to the particularized scope of the search being sought.251 If 
the government is successful in its attention to detail, the court will likely issue 
the warrant.252 Thus, private information stored within mobile dating apps like 
messages, matches, and texts, can be searched in connection with an ongoing 
criminal investigation associated with relationships formed on mobile dating 
apps.253 
CONCLUSION 
Mobile dating apps have presented society with puzzling new obstacles in the 
21st century.254 The millions of users who enjoy such apps have adopted a new 
method of finding love in the digital age at the touch of a button.255 Unfortu-
nately, the hopeful optimism and convenience of sharing in-depth, personal in-
formation online with strangers can put the user’s safety and well-being in jeop-
ardy. If a crime is committed, as a recourse, information can be extracted and 
used against a fellow user of a mobile dating app. A mal-intentioned user’s ge-
olocation data can be obtained with a subpoena or court order, which requires a 
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lesser evidentiary threshold than a warrant supported by probable cause. Proba-
ble cause is not required because the user lacks a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in his or her geolocation and such data can be obtained without a warrant. 
In comparison, users have a sufficient reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their private information data under the scope of the Fourth Amendment. This 
reasonable expectation of privacy requires a warrant pointing to specific, artic-
ulable facts that explain how such data will inevitably lead to the conviction or 
apprehension of a suspect in a crime relating to a relationship formed on a mobile 
dating app. A warrant will be issued if the government, whether it be law en-
forcement or the prosecutor, can indicate with articulable facts that such infor-
mation will assist in the conviction or apprehension of a suspect of a crime 
known to be associated with mobile dating apps. An application for a warrant 
pertaining to the search of a cellphone must state with particularity the data 
within the phone to be searched. If issued, the warrant will uphold the balance 
between privacy risks and the protection of private information, so that justice 
might be achieved in catching perpetrators of crimes on mobile dating apps. 
 
